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I. INTRODUCTION
During the last several decades, industry and export mixes in Taiwan and South Korea have shifted toward
higher-skill, technology-intensive products, while lower-skill, labor-intensive industries have been moving
abroad. At the same time, women's relative educational attainment and skill levels improved considerably. Yet
some trends have differed across these two economies. Taiwan became increasingly open to trade, with a steady
rise in the total trade to output ratio from a low of 48% in the early 1980s to a high of almost 90% by the late
1990s. Against this backdrop, Taiwan's average female-male wage ratio in manufacturing dropped fairly steadily
from 66% in 1981 to 60% in 1993. Only in the mid-1990s did the wage ratio begin a strong climb upward,
reaching 67% by 1999. In contrast, Korea's slow and steady improvement in women's relative wages--from 47%
in 1980 to 58% by 1998--was accompanied by a slight decline in trade openness.1 Industrial structure andpolicy also differ between the two economies, with Taiwan having a higher proportion of small firms and
relatively less emphasis on selective government intervention. These divergent features in two of the most
successful practitioners of the export-led growth model make Taiwan and Korea well-suited to examine the
impact of international trade competition on the gender wage gap.
Increased participation in the global economy is expected to generate growing pressures on firms to engage in
cost-cutting practices that may affect female employees differently than male employees, particularly if sex
discrimination plays a role in firms' hiring and pay decisions. The dynamic implications of Becker's (1959)
theory of discrimination lead us to expect that if discrimination is costly, then increased competition from
international trade will reduce the incentive for employers to discriminate against women. This effect should be
more pronounced in concentrated sectors of the economy, where employers can use excess profits to cover the
costs of discrimination. Alternatively, wage discrimination may increase with growing trade in a context of
employment segregation that limits women's ability to achieve wage gains. For example, trade competition can
entail technological restructuring that contributes to women's absorption into lower paying jobs and a relative
loss of power in wage bargaining situations.
Following the approaches in Borjas and Ramey (1995) and Black and Brainerd (2000), the empirical strategy
controls for differences in market structure across industries in order to isolate the effect of competition from
international trade. The methodology is applied separately to Taiwan and Korea, and the results are compared.
To control for the effects of changes in worker productivity characteristics, estimations are performed using
average residual wage gaps as well as average unadjusted wage gaps by industry. The residual wage gap--the
portion of the wage gap that cannot be explained by observed productivity differences between men and
women--is commonly attributed to wage discrimination against women.
This study contributes to scholarship on globalization by yielding new evidence on the impact of competition
from international trade on the gender wage gap in two of the world's most trade-oriented economies. By
integrating micro data on labor markets with macro data on industrial structure and trade, the study moves
beyond the unsatisfactory treatment of discrimination in the labor literature as an unexplained residual. At the
same time it can include controls for worker productivity characteristics that are lacking in studies that pursue an
industry-level analysis of gender wage differentials. Previous research on the effect of increasing competition on
wage discrimination is still inconclusive and limited in geographical coverage, leaving the impact of
globalization on the gender gap an empirical puzzle.
The econometric analysis does not support the dynamic implications of Becker's theory. Results indicate that
competition from international trade has a positive relationship with residual wage gaps between men and
women in both Taiwan and Korea. While this result is associated more strongly with import growth in Taiwan
and with export growth in Korea, we conclude that in both cases the situation of persistent gender wage
inequality can be best remedied with passage and enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation.
II. COMPETITION AND THE GENDER WAGE GAP: EXISTING RESEARCH
The Neoclassical Approach
According to neoclassical theory based on Gary Becker's The Economics of Discrimination  (1959), long-run
competition is not compatible with persistent discrimination. The existence of an equally productive but
underpaid group of workers will attract profit maximizing firms that don't have discriminatory tastes against this
group. Hence the expansion of demand for the group that is discriminated against will gradually eliminate the
wage differential. Discrimination will persist only in the least competitive sectors. There employers and
managers, who choose to indulge their taste for discrimination by avoiding to hire the lower paid workers and
employing higher cost labor instead, can continue to engage in costly discrimination as long as they are making
excess profits. Under increasing competition in these industries--through, for example, deregulation of the
industry, entry of new firms, or competition from cheaper imports--the use of the underpaid labor is expected to
grow and gradually the increase in demand will bid up the wages of this group of workers, reducing the wage
gap.2
Consistent with this theoretical notion of discrimination, empirical studies operationalize discrimination as the
wage differential that remains after accounting for all measured productivity differences between two groups.This differential is labeled as the "unexplained residual" wage difference.3 A fairly small number of empirical
studies have examined the hypothesis that increased competition leads to less gender discrimination and an
improvement in women's relative wages. Among studies of competition in domestic product markets, Black and
Strahan (2001) find that by reducing rents that previously accrued to men, banking-sector deregulation has led to
improvements in women's relative wages beyond what can be explained by improvements in women's skill
characteristics. Also for the United States, Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske (1997) find evidence of wage
discrimination against female employees among plants with higher levels of product market power, whereas this
finding is not evident in plants with lower levels of market power. However, because discriminatory plants with
market power do not grow more slowly than non-discriminatory plants, the dynamic implies that market forces
over time have little impact on reducing discrimination.
In the labor market, less domestic regulation can contribute to the weakening of anti-discrimination laws and
their enforcement, thus generating the result that greater competition enlarges the gender wage gap. For example,
Meng (1996) reports that the unexplained portion of the gender wage gap is considerably larger for the rural
industrial sector in China than for the urban state sector. The author concludes that wage discrimination by
gender is more problematic in the rural industrial sector because the relative lack of government involvement has
strengthened traditional attitudes toward the unequal roles of men and women in the labor market. But other
researchers argue that more competitive labor markets should work to women's advantage by penalizing firms
that discriminate against women, whereas less competitive labor markets increase the potential for firms to
engage in gender discrimination. For example, Winter-Ebmer (1995) finds that in Austria, monopsony power
among firms contributes to larger gender wage gaps.4
Among studies of competition from international trade, Black and Brainerd (2000) find that in United States
manufacturing industries that are both concentrated and increasingly exposed to competing imports, the residual
gender wage gap narrows to a greater extent than in non-concentrated, trade impacted industries. The authors
interpret this result as evidence supporting Becker's hypothesis that discrimination cannot persist in an
increasingly competitive environment. The authors also find that increased trade openness in general, controlling
for domestic and international competitiveness, increases the U.S. gender wage gap. Curiously, the authors
attribute this latter result to the adverse effect of trade on the wages of unskilled workers (presumed to be
predominantly female), even though regressions with residual wages already control for worker skill
characteristics. A drawback of the study is its application to data from the United States, a relatively closed
economy. Artecona and Cunningham (2001) apply Black and Brainerd's methodology to examine the impact of
trade liberalization in Mexico and obtain similar but weaker results. Similar to Black and Brainerd, the authors
also find that trade liberalization alone widened the residual gender wage gap and attribute this result to the
increasing premium for men's greater experience. In a cross-country analysis using data for 3 middle-income
and 13 high-income countries, Behrman and King (1999) find some evidence that increased competitive
pressure due to trade openness is associated with higher gender wage ratios. Although this result controls for the
impact of competition in domestic markets, as measured by the number of firms relative to production by sector,
it is not robust across sample specifications. 
By contrast, Zveglich, Rodgers, and Rodgers (1997) and Rodgers (1998) strike a cautionary note against
optimism about trade openness. These studies determine how changes over time in measured skill characteristics
and their market returns contribute to the evolution of the wage gap in Taiwan and Korea. They conclude that
women experienced growing losses in unmeasured gender-related factors over time--losses that worked against
women's relative improvements in education and experience. These unexplained losses more than offset
women's measured productivity gains in Taiwan during the 1980s and early 1990s, while they partially offset
women's productivity gains in Korea in the same period. While these studies do not explicitly relate trade
competition to trends in residual gender wage gaps, they do suggest a possible rise in wage discrimination
during a period of outward-oriented growth.
In sum, the empirical studies that examine the impact of increased exposure to competitive forces on the gender
wage gap, often controlling for contemporaneous changes in detailed worker characteristics, have yielded results
that are largely inconclusive. In addition to this group of studies, there are a smaller number of studies that have
adopted the non-neoclassical perspective on the labor market and have sought to examine the relationship
between trade and the gender wage gap in the context of East Asian countries.The Non-Neoclassical Approach
In the non-neoclassical approach, wages are determined by not only labor quality, but also industry
characteristics, which are the product of competition among firms within an industry and across industries.5
Competition is the tendency for uniform profit rates to emerge across industries under conditions of capital
mobility. In contrast to the neoclassical concept, competition is not antithetical to, but encompasses, monopoly
and tendencies toward industrial concentration, since concentration may facilitate mobility of capital and
equalization of the profit rate. Moreover, competition involves not only rivalry and conflict among different firms
within and across industries but also competition among groups of workers.
According to this approach, discrimination is not an aberration that arises when competitive conditions fail to
hold. On the contrary, it is a product of competition among firms and groups of workers, each behaving in
economically rational ways. In this approach, the existence of a hierarchy of jobs and the specter of joblessness
are the preconditions for discrimination. In response to these employment conditions, established groups in the
labor market become primary agents of discrimination. These privileged groups act collectively to secure
favorable employment conditions in a self-interested manner and engage in exclusionary behavior. The groups'
respective bargaining power, shaped by their recent social class history, will determine how successful each
group will be in securing favorable employment conditions. In this approach, the agency of the established group
of workers, by virtue of its greater collective power, will shape the pattern of employment segregation and the
position where each group is able to locate itself in the job hierarchy. 
In this tradition, feminist economists have long argued that organized action by male workers has shaped the
gender-segregated structure of jobs in industrial economies and the associated lower pay for women workers
(Hartmann 1976; Milkman 1990). In the context of contemporary East Asia, given the weakness of organized
labor for much of this period, male workers may not have been as instrumental in shaping the gender-segregated
patterns of employment. A number of studies present evidence to show that, instead, employment segregation by
gender in Korea and Taiwan is produced by employer and state hiring, training, employment, and labor control
policies in a context of patriarchal gender norms (Seguino 1997; Cheng and Hsiung 1994; Nam 1994). Women
are excluded from higher paying, skilled occupations because they are denied access to training, or steered away
by gender specific job advertisements. Their employment experience and potential for wage increases are cut
short by the employer practice of the "marriage bar." Furthermore, women's wage growth is dampened by the
state's promotion of home-based work and relaxation of immigration rules to expand the supply of labor. In turn,
the restriction of women's employment opportunities via these policies limits women's bargaining power
vis-a-vis employers, and therefore their ability to secure wage gains. The state's emphasis on suppressing
collective bargaining in export industries, where women workers are concentrated, has translated into relatively
more suppression of women's bargaining efforts. The state may have implemented some of these policies with
the objective of supporting continued export competitiveness, rather than perpetuating gender inequalities;
nonetheless, their effect is likely to have perpetuated gender wage inequalities. Feminist economists also argue
that Taiwan and Korean firms may have sought to preserve labor peace by favoring men over women in their
employment policies. Furthermore, wage discrimination against women workers in export industries may have
been used as a vehicle by Korea's chaebol, which own firms in a variety of industries, to maintain profitable
operations in their capital-intensive firms.6
The last two decades in Taiwan and Korea represent a confluence of a number of developments that complicate
the analysis of how competition from international trade affects the gender wage gap. Trade competition, outward
foreign direct investment, and technological upgrading in several industries are all linked in the effort to maintain
or extend competitiveness at the firm and industry levels. Empirical studies using the non-neoclassical
framework have examined the impact of trade and foreign direct investment on changes in the gender wage gap.
In the Taiwan context, Berik (2000) uses industry-level panel data to provide an explicit test of the effect of
export orientation in Taiwan on (unadjusted) gender wage ratios. She finds that, after controlling for employment
segregation by gender and other industry characteristics, greater export orientation is associated with smaller
wage differentials between men and women. However, this result is due to the fact that export orientation has a
larger adverse impact on men's wages than women's wages, suggesting the importance of examining absolute
wage levels as well as relative wages.Seguino (2000) finds support for her thesis that divergent trends in the (unadjusted) gender wage ratio in Taiwan
and Korea over the 1981-1992 period are related to the differences in the nature of foreign direct investment
flows in the two countries. Accordingly, greater capital mobility in Taiwan's labor-intensive, female-intensive
sectors leaves women workers more vulnerable to losses of bargaining power in wage negotiations. In Korea,
however, the government exercised greater control over capital outflows in labor-intensive, export-oriented
sectors. Relative to Taiwan, Korean capital was more likely to flow out of capital-intensive, male-dominated
sectors. Subsidized credit to export-oriented firms for productivity-enhancing investments also helped to facilitate
women's relative wage increases in Korea. In an environment where capital is more mobile, the reality or threat
of moving to lower wage sites limits the ability of workers to secure higher wages. An environment of lesser
capital mobility, on the other hand, encourages firms to maintain competitiveness by other strategies, such as
technological upgrading and improvements in product quality. 
Unexamined so far are the effects of technological upgrading that are likely to be differentiated by gender. In a
period of technological restructuring, men may to seek to preserve the new, stable, and higher paying jobs for
themselves in the face of competition from lower-waged women workers (Darity 1989). Women, in turn, may
experience greater job losses as unskilled jobs disappear, with three possible outcomes: first, women may not
find new employment because new jobs require more skills and women may not qualify without training, but
from which they are excluded; second, women may get absorbed into reclassified (lower paying) jobs; and third,
women may be absorbed into new jobs that are not held by men. Each of these scenarios indicates perpetuation
of and perhaps increase in wage discrimination against women workers. While adherents of the non-neoclassical
approach do not predict an increase in wage discrimination in technologically dynamic sectors, one could
plausibly provide such an account: industries that are undergoing technological upgrading are likely to shed
labor associated with the old technology, and hire new, more skilled labor. Such a process is likely to intensify
job competition among groups of workers. This process may widen the gender wage gap as the emerging
employment structure makes it even less likely that women will find employment in higher paying positions, and
their longer job queues for such positions will keep their wages in check.
In sum, non-neoclassical studies have either found or predicted adverse effects of greater international openness
on the gender wage gap. These studies have explained employment and pay discrimination by sex in the context
of employer incentives, the power of established groups of employees, state objectives to maintain export
competitiveness, bargaining power, and gender norms. In such a context, major structural shifts due to capital
mobility, trade, and technological restructuring have affected not only changes in labor demand across sectors,
but also persistent pay inequities between men and women within sectors. Two recent studies have attempted to
disentangle changes in employment and pay in explaining overall changes in Taiwan and Korea's gender wage
gaps. Seguino (2000) argues that the redistribution of employment across industries appears to matter less than
gender pay discrepancies within industries. A similar conclusion is reached in an analysis by occupation groups
rather than industries: pay discrepancies within detailed occupation groups rather than shifts in employment
structures across occupations explain much of Taiwan's wage inequality during the 1980s and 1990s (Zveglich
and Rodgers 2002). These results imply that women in Taiwan and Korea are not receiving equal pay for work
of equal value within industry and occupation groups, results that could be explained by the presence of wage
discrimination in the Taiwan and Korean labor markets. The following descriptive and regression analyses
provide more detail on sectoral patterns in employment and pay differentials and how these differentials are
related to competition from international trade.
III. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
Wage Structures
Korea is notorious for having one of the lowest gender wage ratios in East Asia. Figure 1 provides wage ratio
estimates for selected Pacific Rim economies. In 1990 only Malaysia had a lower wage ratio, and by the late
1990s both Korea and Japan ranked at the bottom with ratios of 58%. Taiwan's gender wage ratio during the
1990s compared favorably with other East Asian economies but stood below that of the industrialized countries,
including Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. According to the Figure, during the 1990s the wage
ratio generally rose across countries.
Turning next to more detailed trends in the Taiwan and Korean gender wage ratios, Figure 2 shows that without
adjusting for any gender differences in skills, the female-male wage ratio in manufacturing fell considerably formuch of the period, from 66% in 1981 to 60% in 1993, before rising again to 67% by 1999. In contrast, women's
relative wages in non-manufacturing industries remained fairly stable at roughly 71% until the mid-1990s, when
they started to climb by about a percentage point a year. Once gender differences in education and experience
are taken into account, women's relative earnings fall sharply until the mid-1990s, particularly in manufacturing,
with a recovery in both sectors during the late 1990s.7 Patterns in Korean gender wage ratios are reported in the
second panel. Like Taiwan, Korean women's relative wages are lower in manufacturing industries than in
non-manufacturing industries, but unlike Taiwan, Korea's female to male wage ratio rose fairly steadily
throughout the period in both parts of the economy. Once gender skill differentials are taken into account,
residual wage ratios are again lower in manufacturing than elsewhere in the economy, with some upward trend
in the early to mid-1980s and not much movement thereafter. Notably, unadjusted wage ratios are quite low in
Korea relative to Taiwan while residual wage ratios are considerably higher in Korea. This result occurs because
observed worker characteristics explain a larger portion of the gender wage differential in Korea than they do in
Taiwan, so once worker characteristics are taken into account, the Korean wage differential narrows more for
Korea than for Taiwan.8
To illustrate how competitive forces from international trade might be related to women's relative wages, Figure
3 plots the manufacturing-sector residual wage ratios against aggregate manufacturing trade ratios in both
Taiwan and Korea.9 In Taiwan, the period of falling residual wage ratios coincides with a fairly steady increase
in trade ratios, while the recovery in women's relative residual wages toward the end of the period coincides with
a flattening in both trade ratios. These patterns, which appear to be slightly stronger for the import series, suggest
that increasing openness over time is negatively related to patterns in women's relative earnings. In Korea, the
slow but steady increase in the residual wage ratio contrasts noticeably with a decline in the aggregate export
ratio for most of the period, while there is no clear relationship with imports.10
Competitive forces from domestic market structures may also have played a role in determining women's relative
wages in the manufacturing sector. Figure 4 reports both wage ratios and wage levels by industry concentration
for Taiwan and Korea. For Taiwan, Panel A shows that both the unadjusted and residual wage ratios are higher
in concentrated industries than in non-concentrated industries. Further analysis (Panel B) shows that wage levels
for both men and women are higher in concentrated industries than non-concentrated industries--though men in
non-concentrated industries earn substantially more than women in concentrated industries.11 The most likely
explanation is the ability of firms in concentrated industries to pay higher wages to all workers, reflecting the
technological dynamism of concentrated industries such as electronics, chemical products, and chemical
materials (Chen and Chen 1995; Amsden and Chu 2002). Chen and Chen (1995) infer technological capability
from sectoral patterns in foreign direct investment. Sectors in which outward foreign direct investment to high
wage economies exceed that directed to low wage economies, are sectors where firms are engaged in efforts to
expand markets by differentiating products from home production. These industries are also likely to have firms
engaged in internal restructuring in Taiwan, introducing new product lines to replace the transplanted ones, and
reemploying skilled employees in newly created departments. Industries that have limited capacity to upgrade
products or pay higher wages, on the other hand, include several of the non-concentrated industries in this study.
These industries experience absolute declines in output as firms replicate home production in low-wage
economies in Southeast Asia. 
Trends over time are similar in Taiwan's concentrated and non-concentrated industries. Both experienced a steep
decline in wage ratios in the 1980s, followed by relatively flat wage ratios in the early 1990s, and a slight rise in
the late 1990s. This commonality across industries suggests that wage trends are shaped by forces other than
changes in industrial policy or industrial structure, which were both relatively stable during the period. In the
latter half of 1990s, the residual wage ratio in non-concentrated industries began to converge to the residual
wage ratio in concentrated industries. Panel B shows that this convergence reflects the fact that men in
non-concentrated industries experienced virtually no wage growth after 1995, while wages of women in
non-concentrated industries continued to rise. In contrast, the Korean residual wage ratio in non-concentrated
industries has been relatively flat while the ratio in concentrated industries has been rising (Panel C). Panel D
shows that, similar to Taiwan, men and women in Korea's concentrated industries earn more than their
counterparts in non-concentrated industries.12
Employment DistributionsChanges in labor demand may provide further insight into the changes in the gender wage gaps. According to
Becker's theory, trade expansion is likely to reduce discrimination by increasing not only women's relative
wages, but also the relative demand for women workers. To shed some light on quantity effects during the period
of analysis, Tables 2 (Taiwan) and 3 (Korea) present more detailed information on employment shares by
gender, wage ratios, and trade shares across sectors for the 1980-99 period. Within manufacturing Taiwan and
Korea share some similar trends, in that both female and male employees recorded dramatic shifts out of
low-skilled jobs-- especially textiles and garments--into higher-skilled jobs--especially electrical and electronic
equipment. In Taiwan in 1981, over half of women's employment in manufacturing (62%) was in textiles and
apparel, electronics, and plastics. In 1999 women's employment continued to be concentrated in the three major
employers of women-- now, electronics, textiles and apparel, and metals (basic and fabricated), which accounted
for 61% of women's employment. Men's employment was more evenly distributed across sectors than women's,
but became more concentrated in a few sectors over time. The top three employers of men accounted for 38% of
male employment in 1981 and 50% in 1999. Employment patterns in Korea are similar. The largest employers
of women were textiles, apparel, and electronics in both 1980 and 1998. In contrast to Taiwan, the concentration
of women in these three industries declined over time, whereas the top three employers of men accounted for a
larger share of male employment in 1998 (42%) than in 1980 (30%). In both economies, the industries where
women's employment is concentrated are also among the most female intensive sectors.
Table 2 does not indicate support for Becker's theory. Increasing trade competition in Taiwan is not associated
with an increase in both the wage ratio and the relative demand for women, particularly in concentrated
industries where this effect may be expected. Among concentrated industries, only the chemical products and
transport equipment industries experienced rising import (or export) ratios that accompanied a rise in residual
wage ratios and an increase in women's share of industry employment. In non-concentrated industries, the
relative demand for women rose along with higher trade shares in all but two industries, but this change was
accompanied by a decline in wage ratios, suggesting absorption of women into lower paying positions. The
non-concentrated sectors have been especially subject to relocation in Southeast Asia and mainland China and
are now the source of rising import competition in Taiwan. Except in the plastics industry, these sectors
experienced growth in their export shares along with rising import shares, which suggests that they continue to
be competitive in export markets. Declining residual wage ratios in all of the non-concentrated industries, not
only in industries undergoing capital flight, may indicate the threat of capital mobility on women's relative
wages.13
Changes in employment, pay, and trade for Korea differ considerably. Table 3 shows that in Korea's
concentrated industries, increases in either import or export shares tend to accompany rising wage ratios.
However, in most cases these gains are associated with a decline in the female share of industry employment.
The relative demand for women also fell in most nonconcentrated industries, and several of these declines were
associated with declining export orientation and rising import competition.14
Focusing on the largest employers, Tables 2 and 3 further show that in both countries import competition in
textiles and apparel is associated with greater decline in job opportunities for women than for men. At the same
time, this industry has become more export-oriented in Taiwan, while in Korea only textiles experienced an
increase in its export share, in both cases most likely on the basis of higher quality products.15 Consistent with
the decline in relative demand for female workers, the residual wage ratio in Taiwan's textile and apparel
industries declined over time, and fell in textiles but was relatively constant in Korea's apparel industry. The
lower wage ratio may reflect not only that the jobs held by women are rapidly disappearing but also that women
are being absorbed into new lower-paying positions in textiles and apparel as the industry undergoes
restructuring. The electrical and electronic goods industries in both Taiwan and Korea also saw a decline in the
percent of the workforce that is female. In Taiwan, this change was associated with a decline in trade ratios and
in the wage ratio, which suggests that women are being absorbed into lower paid jobs and are unable to secure
wage gains relative to men as this concentrated sector undergoes technological restructuring. In Korea, however,
the decline in women's representation among electronics workers was accompanied by a higher wage ratio and
by greater trade shares.16 These patterns among the largest employers signal the contrasting experiences of
female workers in Taiwan and Korea since 1980 as labor markets responded to the forces of trade and
technological change.IV. METHODOLOGY
The regression analysis determines the extent to which the gender wage gap responds to increased competition
from international trade. The basic strategy underlying the empirical approach is to separate the effects of greater
openness in international trade from other contemporaneous shocks that are unrelated to international
competitiveness. The effect of greater openness in international trade is isolated by controlling for differences in
market structure across industries.
Increased openness in international trade is hypothesized to place pressure on firms to reduce discrimination
against women. Firms in relatively more concentrated industries are considered to face less domestic pressure to
engage in competitive behaviors such as reducing costly discrimination against women, compared to firms in
relatively less concentrated industries. Any reduction in the gender wage gap in relatively concentrated
industries should then be attributed to the competitive forces from international trade. Intuitively, the wage effects
from trade openness are identified by comparing the wage impact of trade openness in more concentrated
industries to less concentrated industries.
The estimation model, as employed in Black and Brainerd (2000), tests the idea that changes in competitiveness
over time affect changes in wage gaps over time. Let W ist  be the average log wage of workers with sex s  in
industry i  and year t,  and let ∆ s W ist  denote the difference between men and women in average log wages
in industry i  and year t.  Further, let ∆ t  denote the difference in any variable between two years within any
industry. The estimation equation is:
∆ t ∆ s W ist  =  α 0  +  α 1 C i  +  α 2 ( ∆ t M it ) +  α 3 (C i x∆ t M it ) + error
where the dependent variable is the change over time in the average gender log wage gap by industry. The
notation C i  is the industry-specific measure of domestic concentration, ∆ t M it is the change over time in the
industry-specific import ratio (and alternatively the export ratio), and C i x∆ t M it  represents the interaction
between industry concentration and the change in the trade share. The coefficient α 1 represents the effect from
domestic concentration, and α 2 represents the effect from increased exposure to international trade. The final
coefficient α 3 represents the wage gap effect in a sector that is more open and concentrated; it is the estimate of
changes in international competitiveness on changes in the wage gap over time. Each variable is disaggregated
by detailed industry codes. Regressions are weighted using probability weights based on average-period
employment levels by industry. All data used to estimate the model are described in the Data Appendix. 
The dependent variable is constructed from time series information on average wages by sex, industry, and year.
The above equation is estimated using both average unadjusted wage gaps by industry and average residual
wage gaps by industry. The residual wage gap--the portion of the wage gap which cannot be explained by
observed productivity differences between men and women--is commonly attributed to wage discrimination
against women. To calculate these figures, a human capital earnings function is estimated for male employees in
each year. Here, the dependent variable is log monthly earnings. Because the independent variables include log
monthly hours worked, the analysis effectively estimates an hourly-wage equation.17 The remaining observable
characteristics include a standard set of human capital indicators, such as education, experience, regional
locations, and worker status.18 Occupation dummy variables are excluded since occupational attainment may
involve some degree of labor market discrimination. The coefficients from the male regression are used to
calculate predicted log wages for male and female workers.19 Residual wages are the difference between actual
log wages and predicted log wages, and the residual gender wage gap is the difference between male and female
residual wages.
The industry-specific measure of domestic concentration is constructed from Pareto function estimates of
concentration across revenue categories and industries. Following Curry and George (1983), the number of firms
of size x  or larger in a given industry can be written as a Pareto distribution of the following form:P(x) = (x 0 / x) a       for x greater than a minimum size x 0
where α  denotes a constant. Taking the logarithm of both sides yields the following estimation equation:
log P(x) =  α 0 log x 0  -  α log x
Intuitively, on a log-log scale, the distribution of firms along increasing size categories is described as a
downward sloping line with slope α. 20 The steeper the slope coefficient, the less concentrated--or more
competitive--the industry. This method can be applied to data that is readily available for many developing
countries, including both Taiwan and Korea, whereas other popular indices of concentration have more stringent
data requirements. The Pareto function estimates are used to specify domestic concentration as a continuous
variable and, alternatively, as a dummy variable. For the latter, industries are ranked in descending order of
competitiveness, and industries above a critical breakpoint are assigned a value of zero for non-concentrated,
while industries below a critical breakpoint are assigned a value of one for concentrated.
To check for robustness in our determination of concentration across industries, the Pareto function is estimated
using alternative proxies for size categories and alternative years of data. In particular, revenue size categories are
measured by operating receipts for Taiwan and shipments for Korea. Alternatively, asset size categories are
measured by assets for Taiwan and paid-in-capital for Korea. For each series the function is estimated with data
from a beginning year and an end year. Table 1 presents results for both countries' industry-specific domestic
competitiveness using the Pareto function approach applied to revenue size categories using data from a
beginning year. Rank correlation coefficients indicate that the rankings do not change much over time and are
robust to alternative measures of industry concentration.21
Finally, the import ratio variable is constructed from time series information on the ratio of imports to domestic
production (and alternatively, the ratio of exports to domestic production). Trade shares may be a less precise
indicator of trade openness compared to measures based on tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and export subsidies,
particularly for economies such as Taiwan and South Korea whose governments used an extensive array of trade
policies to protect their export and import-substitute sectors. However, even though the tradeables sectors in
these countries benefited from government protection, the protection was linked with carefully-structured
incentives for competition, thus making trade shares a reasonable indicator of international competitiveness.22 In
the regression analysis, trade ratios are specified as natural logs, so the coefficients on the trade ratio variables are
interpreted as elasticities.
V. REGRESSION RESULTS
Estimation results are found in Table 4 (Taiwan) and Table 5 (Korea). The results are reported as changes in the
male-female wage gap measured in log points. The male-female gap may be converted to a female to male ratio
by exponentiating its negative. Both tables report results from estimations where domestic concentration is
specified as a time-invariant dummy variable (columns 1 and 3) and as a time-invariant continuous variable
(columns 2 and 4). Both tables report results for the full period of analysis (columns 1 and 2), and to avoid
possible distortions from the East Asian financial crisis, for the period ending in 1996 (columns 3 and 4).
A strong result emerges for Taiwan: an increase in international competitiveness over time in concentrated
industries is associated with a widening in the gender wage gap. This result is robust to alternative end years in
estimation, alternative weighting methods, and most alternative specifications of industry concentration.
However, the result holds only when trade openness is measured using the ratio of imports to output by sector.
Table 4 shows that after controlling for worker productivity characteristics, an increase in international
competitiveness from imports in concentrated industries (C  x ∆ t M t ) between 1981 and 1999 is associated
with a statistically significant increase in the residual wage gap. The result could imply that wage discrimination
against women rises in the face of increased competition from imports. While an increase in competitiveness
from exports in concentrated industries (C x ∆ t X t ) also appears to be associated with an increase in the
residual wage gap, the result is not significant. For unadjusted wage gaps in Panel A, the main result holds, but
the coefficient estimate on C  x ∆ t M t  for the 1981-99 period loses its precision once concentration ismeasured using a continuous variable.
When 1996 is used as the endpoint, increased competitiveness from imports in concentrated industries is
similarly associated with wider wage gaps across specifications for both the residual and unadjusted wage gaps.
This result suggests that the main conclusion is not sensitive to any spillover effects from the financial crisis. In
additional tests for robustness (not reported), the positive coefficient on the interaction between concentration
and the import ratio for both the unadjusted and residual wage gap regressions maintains its precision when
concentration is measured using the assets-based Pareto estimates, regardless of the end year of the estimation
period. A similar robustness across alternative measures of concentration is in evidence when 1997 is used as the
end year. When concentration is measured in terms of the number of enterprises/output, the estimates for C  x
∆ t M t  are more sensitive to the end year chosen and only become significant in most specifications that use
1996 and 1997 as the end year.
The conclusion that trade competition in concentrated sectors is positively associated with the gender wage gap
still holds for Korea, but the results are not as strong, and competition from exports appears to matter more than
competition from imports. The first panel of Table 5 shows that increased competitiveness from exports is
associated with a widening in the unadjusted wage gap in concentrated industries when domestic concentration
is specified as a continuous variable but not as a dummy variable. This conclusion also holds for the residual
wage gap for the 1980-98 period only. In the shorter period that controls for the effects of the East Asian crisis, it
appears that competitiveness from imports, rather than exports, is positively associated with widening residual
wage gaps. Similar conclusions are reached in robustness tests when concentration is measured using the
number of establishments/output by sector.
VI. CONCLUSION
This study has examined the impact of international competitiveness on industry-level gender wage gaps in
Taiwan and Korea's manufacturing sectors between 1980 and 1999. During much of this period the gender
wage gap in Taiwan widened, only to begin a recovery in the mid-1990s. By contrast, Korea's gender wage gap
narrowed slowly and steadily through most of the period. While both countries are highly open to trade, trends
in trade ratios also diverged over this period, with Taiwan becoming relatively more exposed to international
competitive pressures than Korea. Taiwan experienced a near continuous rise in both export and import shares
of its manufactured output, while Korea experienced a decline in its export share for much of the period along
with a flat trend in its import share. Taiwan's greater trade openness has been driven by not only increasing
imports of labor-intensive goods from Southeast Asia--which has become the center of Taiwan's
investments--but also by efforts to technologically upgrade the export sector. Both countries had a relatively
stable industrial structure and policy during the period, Taiwan being the more competitive and market-oriented
of the two. The descriptive analysis, therefore, has shown that in Taiwan rising trade openness and a continued
highly competitive industrial structure are associated with rising gender wage inequality. By contrast, Korea's
declining total trade openness, coupled with its less competitive industrial structure, is associated with a gradual
narrowing of the manufacturing-sector gender wage gap.
The study specifically aimed to test the dynamic implications of Becker's theory that greater competition erodes
wage discrimination against women. The empirical analysis centered on the effects of trade on the gender
residual wage gap in relatively concentrated industries. Residual wage gaps, which account for gender
differences in observed productivity characteristics, are often attributed to wage discrimination against women. In
concentrated industries, employers face less pressure from domestic competition to cut costs, so any reduction in
the residual wage gap could then be attributed to the competitive forces from international trade rather than to
domestic pressures. Consistent with the descriptive analysis, industry-level wage-gap regressions do not support
Becker's theory. Quite the contrary, results indicate that increasing competitiveness from trade is positively
associated with the residual wage gap in concentrated industries in both countries. The more robust regression
results emerge for Taiwan. They show that from 1981 to 1999, rising import shares are associated with rising
wage discrimination against women workers in concentrated industries, which include the largest employer and
major exporter sectors, such as the textiles/apparel and the electronics/electrical industries. For Korea, a slight
decline in export orientation is weakly associated with a reduction in wage discrimination against female
workers in concentrated industries between 1980 and 1998.The results for Taiwan may be explained in light of the restructuring in Taiwan's labor-intensive, export-oriented
industries, which experienced layoffs following the expansion of foreign direct investment in the same industries
from Taiwan toward mainland China and Southeast Asia. Concentrated industries that are more successful in
technological upgrading and capturing new export markets are also the ones that disproportionately employ
higher-paid, male workers. Moreover, rising import competition in previously export-oriented sectors appears to
be associated with more layoffs for women than men and greater downward pressure on women's wages in an
environment that affords little protection for workers. Through both channels, female workers appear to
disproportionately bear the costs of greater exposure to international trade. In the Korean case, improvements in
women's relative pay occurred not in the presence of greater competition from international trade, as implied by
Becker's theory, but in the face of slightly weaker international trade pressures. The result is consistent with
arguments in Seguino (2000) that the relative lack of capital mobility out of export-oriented sectors compared to
Taiwan and the government's policies to support upgrading efforts among high-volume firms in these sectors
could have inadvertently benefited women. The comparative analysis of two highly successful export economies
thus shows that increasing international openness does not ensure an improvement in women's relative
economic status.
The major policy initiative to ensure that gains from globalization are shared more equally between men and
women would be to pass and enforce anti-discrimination legislation. This initiative would not only open up
access to jobs for women in a wider range of occupations and industries than the ones they are concentrated in
but also ensure equal pay for equal work. The political economic context, however, indicates the enormous
difficulty of passing, let alone enforcing, such legislation. Taiwan has had an equal pay for equal work clause on
the books since enacting the 1984 Labor Standards Law, but evidence in Chiu (1993) shows that firms were less
likely to comply with the equal pay clause than they were with other measures in the Labor Law. Taiwan still
has no equal opportunity in employment legislation on the books. Chen's (2001) discussion of the "Gender
Equal Employment" Bill (GEEB), first introduced in the parliament in 1989, shows the resistance to the bill that
came from business groups and economic ministries of the government entrusted with ensuring continued export
competitiveness. The bill is a comprehensive law aimed to protect women's equal rights in the labor market. It
prohibits employment discrimination in various forms and introduces provisions such as parental leave to reduce
the conflict between employment and family responsibilities. Chen states that representatives of business groups
threatened to move firms out of Taiwan or not hire women, should the bill be passed, and in the recessionary
environment of the early 1990s these threats were effective in preventing the passage of this bill into law. The
threats suggest that wage discrimination against women workers continues to be an important means for
continued export competitiveness, in spite of the manufacturing industry's shift from the low-wage route to
maintaining export competitiveness to a route where competition is more on the basis of export product quality.
In the Korean case, the government has had equal opportunity in employment legislation on the books since
1987. Additional labor reforms in 1987 relaxed the government's control on unions and liberalized collective
bargaining procedures. These changes resulted in greater pressure on firms to comply with existing labor
standards they had previously ignored, including an equal pay for equal work clause. The slight decline in export
orientation and support from the government's industrial policy in concentrated industries may have facilitated
better enforcement of this anti-discrimination legislation during the period of analysis, helping to explain the
decline in wage discrimination in export-oriented, concentrated industries.
DATA APPENDIX
Taiwan's standard industry classification has undergone six revisions since its inception in 1967. The first year of
data used in this study is based on the second revision. Revisions 3 (1983), 4 (1987), and 6 (1996) contain
changes primarily at the three-digit level, which are readily reconcilable with earlier versions for the two-digit
classifications. Only the fifth revision, published in 1991, contains major changes at the one- and two-digit levels,
but this change only affects the labor data from 1993 onwards. Korea's standard industry classification has
undergone seven revisions since its establishment in 1963. The first year of data used in this study is based on
the fourth revision. Revisions 5 (1984) and 7 (1998) contain changes primarily at the four-digit and five-digit
levels, which are readily reconcilable with earlier versions for three-digit classifications (Kang, 2001). Only the
sixth revision, published in 1991, contains major changes at all levels of aggregation, but this change only affects
the labor data from 1993 onward. Both the Taiwan and Korea industry classification systems are based oninternational standards. We categorize manufacturing industries by two-digit codes for Taiwan and three-digit
codes for Korea since the labor data record industry of employment at that level. As shown in Appendix Table 1,
some additional aggregation was necessary to provide consistency over time and to avoid small cell sizes in the
calculation of average wages by gender and industry.23
Appendix Table 2 summarizes the key variables and their sources. The labor data for Taiwan are from the
Manpower Utilization Survey for the period 1981-1999. This household-level survey contains detailed
information on earnings, employment, and worker characteristics. The Korean labor data come from the
Occupational Wage Survey (OWS), but due to constraints on data availability, the sample is limited to the years
1980, 1983, 1986, 1989, 1992, 1994, 1996, and 1998. This establishment-level survey similarly contains
comprehensive labor-market information for individual workers. Surveyed establishments are selected using a
stratified random sampling method from establishments with at least 10 workers. In addition to small firms, the
OWS also excludes the self-employed, family workers, temporary workers, and public-sector workers. Wages for
both countries are deflated using the consumer price index.
The US-dollar value of exports and imports by 4-digit International Standard Industrial Category (ISIC) are from
the International Economic Data Bank (IEDB) for the period 1980-1999 for both Taiwan and Korea. IEDB
converts UN trade data from Standard International Trade Categories to ISIC using concordance tables based on
the structure of trade and production in the two economies. The trade ratios are relative to a measure of gross
production by industry. For Taiwan, the data are gross receipts by 2-digit level Taiwan industry codes (revision
6) in new Taiwan dollars. The production data are converted to US dollars using the annual average exchange
rate. The trade data are regrouped according to 2-digit Taiwan industry codes (revision 6) using a linking
scheme based on concordance tables published by the United Nations and the government of Taiwan. For
Korea, the production data are gross output in US dollars by 3-digit ISIC codes from the UNIDO Industrial
Statistics Database.
For Taiwan, the data for estimating domestic competitiveness come from the Industrial and Commercial Census.
This census, conducted once every five years, contains data by disaggregated industry on the number of
enterprises in various operating-receipts categories of increasing size. The census also has data on the number of
enterprises by asset size categories and by industry. We use both series in alternative estimates of the Pareto
function for a base year (1981) and an end year (1996). For Korea, the data for estimating domestic
competitiveness come from the Korean Industrial Census. This census, conducted once every five years, contains
data by disaggregated industry on the number of establishments in various shipment-value categories of
increasing size. The census also has data by industry on the number of establishments by asset size categories, as
indicated by paid-in-capital. Both series are used in alternative estimates of the Pareto function for a base year
(1983) and an end year (1998).Appendix Table 1: Consistent Manufacturing Aggregates by Standard Industrial
Classification Codes, Taiwan and Korea





1. Food, Beverage, and Tobacco Manufactures 20, 21 11, 12
2. Textile Industries; Manufacture of Wearing Apparel and Accessories 22, 23 13, 14
3. Manufacture of Leather, Fur, and Related Products 24 15
4. Manufacture of Wood Products, Bamboo Products, and Furniture 25 16, 17
5. Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products; Printing 26 18, 19
6. Manufacture of Chemical Materials; Manufacture of Petroleum
and Coal Products 27, 29 21, 23
7. Manufacture of Chemical Products 28 22
8. Manufacture of Rubber Products 30 24
9. Manufacture of Plastic Products 31 25
10. Manufacture of Non-metallic Mineral Products 32 26
11. Basic Metal Industries; Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products 33, 34 27, 28
12. Manufacture and Repair of Machinery and Equipment 35 29
13. Manufacture and Repair of Electrical and Electronic Machinery and
Equipment 36 31
14. Manufacture and Repair of Transport Equipment 37 32
15. Manufacture of Precision Instruments 38 33
16. Manufacture of Miscellaneous Industrial Products 39 39





1. Food Manufactures 311 151-154
2. Beverage and Tobacco Manufactures 313, 314 155, 160
3. Textile Industries. 321 171-173
4. Manufacture of Wearing Apparel 322 181
5. Manufacture of Leather, Fur, Related Products, and Footwear (except
Rubber or Plastic Footwear) 323, 324 182, 191, 192
6. Manufacture of Wood Products and Cork Products 331 201, 202
7. Manufacture of Furniture and Fixtures 332 361
8. Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products 341 210
9. Printing and Publishing 342 221, 222
10. Manufacture of Chemical Materials 351 241
11. Manufacture of Chemical Products 352 242, 243
12. Manufacture of Petroleum and Coal Products 353, 354 231-233
13. Manufacture of Rubber Products 355 251
14. Manufacture of Plastic Products 356 252
15. Manufacture of Pottery, China, and Glass Products 361, 362 261
16. Manufacture of Other Non-metallic Mineral Products 369 269
17. Iron and Steel Basic Industries; Non-Ferrous Metal Basic Industries 371, 372 271-273
18. Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products 381 281, 289
19. Manufacture of Machinery and Equipment 382 291-29320. Manufacture of Electrical and Electronic Machinery and Equipment 383 300, 311-315,
319, 321-323
21. Manufacture of Transport Equipment 384 341-343,
351-353, 359
22. Manufacture of Precision Instruments 385 331-333
23. Manufacture of Miscellaneous Industrial Products 390 369, 371, 372
Sources: DGBAS (1987, 1991) and NSO (2001).Appendix Table 2: Key Variable Definitions and Data Sources
Variable Description Date Source: Taiwan Date Source: Korea
Real Wage:
   Nominal Wage Average wages and average









1980, 83, 86, 89, 92,
94, 96, 98
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   Exchange Rate Average exchange rate Financial Statistics
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1983, 1998Table 1: Pareto Function Estimates of Domestic Competitiveness For Taiwan and Korea
(Industry ranking in descending order of competitiveness)
Taiwan 1981 Korea 1983
1. Basic Metal Industries; Fabricated
Metal Products
-0.77 1. Furniture and Fixtures -0.75
2. Wood Products, Bamboo Products, and
Furniture
-0.76 2. Miscellaneous Industrial Products -0.73
3. Machinery and Equipment -0.76 3. Wood Products and Cork Products -0.73
4. Paper and Paper Products; Printing -0.71 4. Printing and Publishing -0.71
5. Miscellaneous Industrial Products -0.71 5. Wearing Apparel -0.66
6. Plastic Products -0.67 6. Fabricated Metal Products -0.65
7. Food, Beverage, and Tobacco
Manufactures
-0.62 7. Plastic Products -0.61
8. Textile Industries; Wearing Apparel &
Accessories
-0.61 8. Machinery and Equipment -0.58
9. Non-metallic Mineral Products -0.61 9. Other Non-metallic Mineral Products -0.57
10. Chemical Products -0.58 10. Precision Instruments -0.57
11. Leather, Fur, and Related Products -0.56 11. Leather, Fur, Related Products, and
Footwear
-0.54
12. Transport Equipment -0.53 12. Textile Industries -0.54
13. Rubber Products -0.52 13. Pottery, China, and Glass Products -0.53
14. Electrical, Electronic Machinery &
Equipment
-0.51 14. Food Manufactures -0.47
15. Precision Instruments -0.51 15. Beverage and Tobacco Manufactures -0.45
16. Chemical Materials, Petroleum, and
Coal Products
-0.26 16. Paper and Paper Products -0.44
      17. Transport Equipment -0.40
      18. Electrical, Electronic Machinery &
Equipment
-0.37
      19. Rubber Products -0.35
      20. Chemical Products -0.24
      21. Iron and Steel, Non-Ferrous Metal
Industries
-0.23
      22. Chemical Materials -0.22
      23. Petroleum and Coal Products -0.04
Note: Figures report the coefficient estimates of Pareto functions using data on number of enterprises by size categories

















Base Change Base Change





3.3 4.9 17.8 3.7 12.6 21.1 -5.9 -6.7 9.5
Wood




1.4 1.5 8.3 0.7 11.6 18.4 -3.3 39.8 243.4
Paper;




6.7 -2.6 3.9 -1.5 57.5 54.5 -1.0 8.6 6.1
Plastic





5.1 0.2 7.2 -1.3 35.7 38.7 -2.5 12.4 -6.4
Textile and




4.5 -1.7 5.9 -1.5 37.3 30.5 -8.5 10.3 -4.8
Chemical




4.4 -2.7 2.5 -1.5 57.8 53.5 -14.5 13.5 -67.4
Transport
Equipment 1.7 1.6 6.0 0.3 17.9 26.5 2.6 15.0 9.5
Rubber
Products 0.9 1.7 1.2 0.4 36.8 52.6 2.4 -2.1 -8.1
Electrical,
Electronic 17.3 16.5 10.0 9.0 57.5 55.5 -2.8 -0.5 -8.6
Precision
Instruments 1.4 -0.4 1.6 -0.7 41.0 44.1 -6.4 282.9 62.0Chemical
Materials,
Petroleum

















Base Change Base Change
1980 1998-1980 1980 1998-1980 1980 1998 1998-1980 1998-1980 1998-1980
Non-Concentrated Industries
Furniture and








1.4 -0.2 2.8 -1.2 30.3 19.6 1.0 31.2 -34.2
Printing and
Publishing 1.0 1.3 2.4 0.7 27.7 21.1 -7.0 -1.6 -4.8
Wearing




2.2 0.5 8.0 -3.6 19.8 17.9 13.4 -12.9 -14.6
Plastic








0.9 1.4 4.4 -1.8 16.0 23.8 -8.8 -0.1 -10.9
Precision




2.8 0.3 2.8 -1.2 47.5 41.5 -14.7 -16.5 14.4
Textile




1.5 -1.2 2.2 -1.2 37.4 8.9 21.0 11.1 2.0
Concentrated Industries
Food
Manufactures 5.1 4.8 5.6 -0.6 45.0 40.9 9.2 -2.0 -1.8Beverage and




1.1 0.0 2.5 0.5 29.0 11.5 8.1 -6.6 14.6
Transport
Equipment 0.7 3.4 7.8 5.9 7.1 9.5 11.2 -31.7 -0.1
Electrical,
Electronic 16.1 11.0 10.8 6.9 57.4 35.2 13.0 17.3 36.2
Rubber
Products 6.3 -5.5 4.4 -2.8 56.6 15.3 5.1 0.2 107.6
Chemical
Products 3.0 1.7 4.3 0.5 38.5 25.5 10.8 3.3 6.0
Iron and Steel 0.4 0.6 7.5 -2.7 4.3 6.9 4.4 0.7 4.7
Chemical
Materials 0.4 0.3 2.4 1.1 12.3 6.3 -2.5 -8.6 25.7
Petroleum
and Coal 0.2 0.8 2.4 0.8 5.8 9.5 -21.1 10.7 28.7Table 4: Determinants of Change in the Gender Wage Gap, Taiwan
(in log points x 100; standard errors in parentheses)
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Unadjusted Wage Gap
C -15.23*** -54.13*** -18.35*** -69.28***
  (2.94) (8.88) (5.36) (18.58)
∆ t M t -4.73 28.12 -3.76* 61.72***
  (3.43) (22.05) (2.07) (18.68)
C x∆ t M t 10.66* 43.37 17.83*** 85.72***
  (5.08) (32.76) (4.71) (25.85)
constant 7.35*** -34.89*** 12.02*** -42.34***
  (1.89) (5.68) (2.88) (13.00)
C -9.51** -44.66** -4.18 -19.23
  (3.61) (16.53) (4.62) (20.97)
∆ t X t -1.79 2.20 4.26 -16.55
  (1.61) (10.37) (5.24) (16.49)
C x∆ t X t -1.04 6.46 -4.22 -29.17
  (5.36) (15.11) (11.33) (24.87)
constant 5.25 -28.40** 7.80** -6.91
  (2.98) (9.71) (2.74) (13.66)
Panel B: Residual Wage Gap
C -6.86** -20.28** -11.03 -39.93
  (3.00) (8.08) (6.96) (24.27)
∆ t M t -1.17 37.28** -1.46 72.00***
  (1.86) (13.10) (4.16) (17.71)
C x∆ t M t 11.07** 49.85** 17.74*** 96.21***
  (3.72) (17.86) (5.57) (25.20)
constant 8.39*** -8.31 12.62** -19.87
  (1.72) (5.91) (5.47) (16.10)
C -2.01 -20.44 -0.66 4.99
  (3.71) (15.11) (6.51) (31.11)
∆ t X t -5.73 14.73 -4.29 -8.23
  (3.73) (9.38) (10.29) (22.27)
C x∆ t X t 8.64 25.90 9.11 -14.81
  (6.04) (15.01) (14.47) (35.87)constant 9.25*** -4.85 12.93** 15.22
  (2.53) (9.26) (5.58) (18.55)
Note: Columns differ as follows: (1) C = dummy variable, estimation period is 1981-1999; (2) C = continuous variable,
estimation period is 1981-1999; (3) C = dummy variable, estimation period is 1981-1996; and (4) C = continuous variable,
estimation period is 1981-1996. The notation *** indicates statistically significant at the .01 level; ** at the .05 level; * at
the .10 level. Each regression has 16 observations and is weighted using probability weights based on average-period
employment levels by industry. The R2 statistics range from 33% to 52% for regressions with import ratios, and 1% to
32% for regressions with export ratios.Table 5: Determinants of Change in the Gender Wage Gap, Korea
(in log points x 100 standard errors in parentheses)
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Unadjusted Wage Gap
C -10.83* 3.65 -4.60 5.48
  (5.82) (27.06) (5.81) (19.53)
∆ t M t -1.09 -5.14 -0.72 29.75
  (1.94) (15.91) (1.10) (18.40)
C x∆ t M t -4.81 -6.66 8.68 46.71
  (4.81) (26.62) (10.82) (28.73)
constant -10.76*** -14.04 -13.95*** -13.93
  (3.24) (15.11) (2.75) (10.60)
C -16.21** -35.26 -8.06 -4.70
  (7.67) (30.76) (4.74) (32.21)
∆ t X t 5.33** 20.80** 4.92*** 17.26*
  (2.17) (8.60) (1.32) (9.66)
C x∆ t X t 7.17 29.47* 7.68 23.65*
  (9.61) (14.32) (9.21) (13.56)
constant -11.66*** -36.96* -12.01*** -19.40
  (2.42) (17.81) (1.45) (16.72)
Panel B: Residual Wage Gap
C -10.66* -10.99 -6.44 -11.13
  (5.38) (18.38) (4.77) (14.71)
∆ t M t 1.86 5.82 0.61 25.92**
  (2.80) (9.60) (2.41) (9.86)
C x∆ t M t -1.36 6.36 8.20 38.88**
  (3.80) (15.94) (5.87) (16.28)
constant -1.40 -11.71 -2.43 -11.28*
  (4.57) (9.28) (4.16) (6.30)
C -15.96*** -37.39 -9.84** -21.63
  (4.93) (22.41) (4.49) (22.00)
∆ t X t 1.21 14.06*** 3.60 11.25**
  (5.25) (3.60) (3.48) (4.20)
C x∆ t X t 7.05 21.46* 3.57 13.27
  (6.34) (10.45) (4.78) (8.07)
constant -0.78 -26.87** -0.33 -16.06
  (3.88) (11.45) (3.58) (10.16)
Note: Columns differ as follows: (1) C = dummy variable, estimation period is 1980-1998; (2) C = continuous variable,
estimation period is 1980-1998; (3) C = dummy variable, estimation period is 1980-1996; and (4) C = continuous variable,
estimation period is 1980-1996. The notation *** indicates statistically significant at the .01 level; ** at the .05 level; * at
the .10 level. Each regression has 23 observations and is weighted using probability weights based on average-period
employment levels by industry. The R2 statistics range from 1% to 27% for regressions with import ratios, and 18% to
34% for regressions with export ratios.Figure 1: Manufacturing-Sector Female/Male Wage Ratios: Cross-Country Evidence
Note: Wage data are for 1990 and 1999, or for the closest available years.
Sources: International Labour Office (2000); authors' calculations for South Korea and Taiwan.Figure 2: Gender Wage Ratios by Manufacturing Industry Status, Taiwan and KoreaFigure 3: Gender Wage Ratios and Manufacturing Trade Ratios, Taiwan and KoreaFigure 4: Gender Wage Ratios by Industry Concentration, Taiwan and KoreaREFERENCES
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ENDNOTES 
1. Korea's total trade ratio fell continuously from a high of 56% in 1985 to a low of 45% in 1993, thereafter
rising again, owing to the collapse of output, to 51% in 1997 and 60% in 1998.  
2. Becker's original notion of competitiveness is based on characteristics of domestic industrial structure.
More recent empirical studies on discrimination include international trade as a potential source of
increased competitiveness. Behrman and King (1999) report that the idea that international trade increases
competition or imposes market discipline is a longstanding one in the trade literature, and one that has
recently found empirical support in Levinsohn (1993).  
3. A common technique, based on Oaxaca (1973), uses cross-sectional data on workers and decomposes the
wage gap in individual years into a portion explained by measured skill differences between men and
women, and a residual portion commonly attributed to wage discrimination.  
4. The totality of findings for China is quite mixed. For example, contrary to his previous work, Meng (2000)
reports that men earn significantly more than women in domestic market-oriented, state sector
employment whereas no gender differential exists in foreign-owned firms. The World Bank (2001) further
discusses the mixed evidence on increased labor market competition and the gender wage gap.  
5. The summary of theoretical frameworks is based on Darity (1989), Williams and Kenison (1996), Mason
and Williams (1997), and Mason (1999).  
6. See Seguino (1997), Cheng and Hsiung (1994), and Nam (1994) for further discussion of these
arguments.  
7. For each country, the residual wage ratio in manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries is calculated
using a wage regression based on the full set of non-farm employees.  
8. For Taiwan, observed productivity characteristics explain about 40% to 60% of the gender wage
differential during the 1980s and early 1990s (Zveglich, Rodgers, and Rodgers 1997), while for Korea,
observed characteristics explain about 70% to 80% of the gender wage differential during the same period
(Rodgers 1998).  
9. The aggregate manufactured export share is constructed as total manufactured exports divided by total
manufactured output, and similarly for imports.  10. The sharp rise in the aggregate export ratio between 1996 and 1998 reflects the dramatic drop in output
due to the Asian crisis.  
11. This inverse relationship between industry competitiveness and wage levels holds at the inter-industry
level in a given year as well, especially in the early 1980s, and is robust to the measure of industry
concentration used.   
12. Similar to Taiwan, in a given year, the more concentrated the industry the higher the wages of both men
and women, and this relationship is also robust to the measure of industry concentration used.  
13. Further analysis shows that trends based on sectoral average changes over the entire period are consistent
with the changes reported in Table 2.  
14. Trends in Korea's non-concentrated industries are sensitive to the choice of 1998 as the end year.
Changes over time in sectoral averages show that the trend in non-concentrated industries is one of
increasing trade shares that are associated with a decline in wage ratios and in the female share of industry
employment.  
15. Chen and Chen (1995) indicate that in Taiwan, outward foreign direct investment in textiles and apparel is
largely motivated by attempts to maintain firm competitiveness by relocation to lower wage sites. The
relocation of apparel production to China and Southeast Asia stimulated expansion of exports of selected
products in textiles to these countries, fostering cross-border linkage effects based on prior vertical
integration of these industries in Taiwan. However, this linkage has not prevented the decline of Taiwan's
textile industry given the loss of European and U.S. export markets and the simultaneous undermining of
cross border linkages by some textile firms that invested abroad along with apparel factories. This
intra-industry restructuring is consistent with a gendered restructuring of employment opportunities in
Taiwan, whereby men's employment expands in the growing, higher-paying sub-sectors of textiles, while
women's job opportunities decline or are reclassified as the lower tier jobs in textiles and apparel.  
16. Closer inspection of Korean time series data for electronics indicates the outlier nature of the 1998 trade
shares and the need to isolate the effects of the Asian crisis. Over the 1980-1996 period, the rising wage
ratio was associated with a decline in both export and import shares, but trade shares sharply rose after
1996 owing to the collapse of industry output following the crisis.  
17. This approach is followed because the Taiwan survey reports monthly earnings and weekly hours
worked.  
18. In particular, the regressions for both Taiwan and Korea include a dummy variable for part-time worker
(less than forty hours per week for Taiwan or 160 hours per month for Korea), dummy variables for
education level attained, years of potential experience (age, minus education, minus six) and its square,
years of establishment-specific tenure and its square, and dummy variables for regional locations. In
addition, regressions for Taiwan include dummy variables for major area of study and a dummy variable
for urban status.  
19. This approach, also followed in Blau and Kahn (1996), implicitly assumes that male coefficients more
accurately reflect competitive returns to observable characteristics than female coefficients. An alternative
approach combines coefficient estimates for both men and women following Oaxaca (1973). These two
approaches yield the same measures for the total, predicted, and residual earnings gaps.  
20. The data source presents size categories as ranges. In the estimations, size levels are chosen to be the
mid-point for each range. Because the final range has no upper bound, the size level is top coded as 1.2
times the lower bound.  
21. In further robustness checks, results are compared with rankings based on available data for number of
enterprise (or establishment) units divided by output per industry, the K-firm concentration ratio, the
Herfindahl index, and the profit rate by industry.  
22. See Amsden (2001) and Stiglitz and Yusuf (2001) for discussions of the competitive environment within
the export and import-competing sectors. Also, data constraints for measures related to trade policy in
both Taiwan and Korea limit our options for measuring international competitiveness.  
23. The minimum cell size for a gender-industry group in the sample period was 13. Larger cell sizes would
entail a tradeoff with degrees of freedom in the model estimations. 